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OBLIGATIONS
Bruce V. Schewe*
During the past year, the reported decisions covered the span of
the law of obligations, including classification of contracts,' offer and
acceptance, 2 implied terms of agreements, 3 solidary obligations 4 parol
evidence,' interpretation of contracts 6 breach of agreements, 7 specific

Copyright 1989, by
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Member, American, Louisiana State, and New Orleans Bar Associations; Lecturer
on Civil Law, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans.
1. E.g., Hageman v. Foreman, 539 So. 2d 678, 680 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989) (The
court set forth three factors to distinguish a contract to build from a contract of sale.)
(Quoting Duhon v. Three Friends Homebuilders, 396 So. 2d 559 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).).
2. E.g., Harleaux v. Wood, 542 So. 2d 747, 752 n.7 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (The
"[alcceptance need not be by the same act or instrument.") (citations omitted); Schulingkamp v. Aicklen, 534 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
3. E.g., Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000, 538 So. 2d 569
(La. 1989).
4. E.g., Lee v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 540 So. 2d 287 (La. 1989).
5. E.g., Burford v. Burford, 541 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989); Cheek v.
Uptown Square Wine Merchants, W.F., Inc., 538 So. 2d 663, 666 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1989) (A party may "not use parole evidence . . . to show an allegedly different agreement
was made."); Grant v. Ouachita Nat'l Bank, 536 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988);
Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n v. Airport Mini-Warehouses, Inc., 531 So. 2d 524, 527
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1988) ("[Alntecedent verbal agreements which are in conflict with a
written agreement cannot be proved by parole evidence. Parlay Enterprises, Inc. v. R-BCo., Inc. of Bossier, 504 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987), writ den., 508 So. 2d 819
(La. 1987); Mott v. Phillips, 372 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979)."); Shreveport
Great Empire Broadcasting, Inc. v. Chicoine, 528 So. 2d 633, 635 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1988) ("Parole evidence is ... admissible, between the parties to a written act, to prove
want or failure of consideration. Scafidi v. Johnson, 420 So. 2d 1113 (La. 1982); Gulf
States Finance Corporation v. Airline Auto Sales, Inc., 248 La. 591, 181 So. 2d 36
(1965).").
6. E.g., Frischhertz Elect. Co. v. Housing Auth. of New Orleans, 534 So. 2d 1310,
1314 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 536 So. 2d 1236 (1989) ("In contract cases,
custom should be relevant only if the contract is silent on the issue.") (citing La. Civ.
Code arts. 2053-2056; Mississippi River Grain Elevator, Inc. v. Bartlett & Co., 659 F.2d
1314, 1318 (5th Cir. 1981); Fontenot's Rice Drier, Inc. v. Farmer's R. Mill Co., 329 So.
2d 494, 498 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 239 (1976)).
7. E.g., Stewart v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 542 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1987) ("Anticipatory breach of contract, while actionable ... , is not applicable where
the contract has expired or terminated of its own accord.").
*
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novation," and unjust enrich-

ment.12 The following discussion reviews the more significant of these
opinions.
The Infirmities of Irrevocable Offers
Article 1809 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 18701' recognized that
an offer of contract may allow a period for acceptance during which
it may not be withdrawn. Thus, under old article 1809, "if an offer

contains an expression of willingness to give the offeree a time for
acceptance, or the circumstances of the case give rise to the presumption
that such is the offeror's intention, the offer will be irrevocable. . . . 4
The jurisprudence, however, did not reflect the intention of the legis-

lation; the courts were "reluctant to give article 1809 its historical
meaning and effect."' 5

8. E.g., Sizeler Property Investors, Inc. v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 544 So. 2d 53
(La. App. 4th Cir.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 550 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ granted, 548 So. 2d 1215, order dissolved, 552 So. 2d 372.
9. E.g., Lee v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 540 So. 2d 287, 294 (La. 1989) (citing La.
Civ. Code art. 1803).
10. E.g., Rhodes v. Nalencz, 545 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Anderson, 533 So. 2d 118, 120 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ denied,
535 So. 2d 744 (1989) ("[Clompromises are favored in the law and the burden of proving
the invalidity of the compromise is on the party attacking it. Saunders v. New Orleans
Public Service, Inc., 387 So. 2d 603 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) writ den., 394 So. 2d
614 (La. 1980)."); C. Bel for Awnings, Inc. v. Blaine-Hays Constr. Co., 532 So. 2d 830
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1988)).
11. E.g., City of Donaldsonville v. Thiac, 542 So. 2d 1111, 1116 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1989) (citing La. Civ. Code arts. 1879-1881; Huval Tractor, Inc. v. Journet, 413 So. 2d
978 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 446 (1982)).
12. E.g., FPS, Inc. v. Continental Contractors, Inc., 537 So. 2d 831, 834 (La. App.
5th Cir.), writ denied, 540 So. 2d 328 (1989) (citing Minyard v. Curtis Products, 251 La.
624, 205 So. 2d 422 (1967)).
13. La. Civ. Code art. 1809 (1870):
The obligation of the contract not being complete, until the acceptance, or in
cases where it is implied by law, until the circumstances, which raise such
implication, are known to the party proposing; he may therefore revoke his
offer or proposition before such acceptance, but not without allowing such
reasonable time as from the terms of his offer he has given, or from the
circumstances of the case he may have supposed to have intended to give to
the party, to communicate his determination.
For brevity, the writer will use the shorthand notations of "old article" when referring
to the Code of 1870 and "new article" in the context of the Civil Code as revised by
Act 331 of 1984.
14. Smith, An Analytical Discussion of the Promise of Sale and Related Subjects,
Including Earnest Money, 20 La. L. Rev. 522, 531 (1960) (footnote omitted); Comment,
Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 La. L. Rev. 182, 189 (1938).
15. Smith, supra note 14, at 531 (citing Miller v. Douville, 45 La. Ann. 214, 12 So.
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In an effort to articulate more forcefully the ideas contained in old
articles 180216 and 1809,17 the Legislature, as a part of the revision of
the law of obligations, 8 has provided the following principles:
An offer that specifies a period of time for acceptance is irrevocable during that time. When the offeror manifests an intent
to give the offeree a delay within which to accept, without
specifying a reasonable time, the offer is irrevocable for a reasonable time.' 9
As specifically crafted as is the phrasing of these two standards of
irrevocability, there is at least one scenario not addressed: when an offer
states a period for acceptance that proves, under the circumstances, too
long to be reasonable. A court facing this question would be called
upon either to invoke the plain language 20 of the first sentence of the
legislation (consequently forcing the offeror to hold the offer open for
acceptance for an unreasonable period) or to reason its way into the
latter formula (with the result of permitting the offeror to withdraw his
proposal before the stated time of irrevocability). Schulingkamp v.
Aicklen 2' resolved this dilemma satisfactorily.
Mrs. Schulingkamp commenced a lawsuit on a promissory note made
by Mr. and Mrs. Aicklen and delivered with an offer to purchase
immovable property.2 2 In their offer, dated November 15, 1984, Mr.
and Mrs. Aicklen stated that it was "binding and irrevocable 'thru and

132 (1893); Blanks v. Sutcliffe, 122 La. 448, 47 So. 765 (1908); Vermillion Sugar Co. v.
Valee, 134 La. 661, 64 So. 670 (1914); Miller v. Oden, 149 La. 771, 90 So. 167 (1929);
Glover v. Abney, 160 La. 775, 106 So. 735 (1926); Albert v. R.P. Farnsworth & Co.,
176 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949)).
16. La. Civ. Code art. 1802 (1870):
He is bound by his proposition, and the signification of his dissent will be of
no avail, if the proposition be made in terms, which evince a design to give
the other party the right of concluding the contract by his assent; and if that
assent be given within such time as the situation of the parties and the nature
of the contract shall prove that it was the intention of the proposer to allow.
17. See La. Civ. Code art. 1928, comment (a).
18. 1984 La. Acts No. 331.
19. La. Civ. Code art. 1928.
20. Article 9 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]here a law is clear and unambiguous
and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as
written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature."
21. 534 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
22. Mr. and Mrs. Aicklen "submitted a written offer dated November 15, 1984 to
purchase plaintiff's property . . . . At the same time . . . [they] gave plaintiff a promissory
note in the amount of $10,500.00." Id. at 1329. The note carried the inscription that it
"would be changed to a note for $7,500.00, and $3,000.00 cash 'as soon as the contract
had been signed by the seller."' Id.
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until the Act of Sale was to be passed.' "23 The offer contained at least
one material condition-that Mrs. Schulingkamp cause the Parish of
Jefferson to grant a certain variance for planned construction. Thirtysix days thereafter, on December 21, 1984, Mr. and Mrs. Aicklen sent
a telegram to Mrs. Schulingkamp, reading in part as follows:
[W]e made an offer on November 15, 1984 to purchase 2932
Johnson Street and side lot. No acceptance ever received as of
December 21, 1984. We withdraw our offer to purchase prop24
erty.
On December 26, 1984, Mrs. Schulingkamp purported to accept the
offer by affixing her signature to the document evidencing it; her attorney
then sent the papers to Mr. and Mrs. Aicklen on January 2, 985, and
they received it on January 9, 1985. The lawyer for Mrs. Schulingkamp
also advised Mr. and Mrs. Aicklen that the property had been surveyed
for a resubdivision in connection with Mrs. Shulingkamp's forthcoming
request to Jefferson Parish to grant the variance at issue. Mrs. Schulingkamp's lawyer further stated that "he anticipated an act of sale on
February 15, 1985."2s Although the Parish of Jefferson approved the
resubdivision, it did not approve any variance and, significantly, the
parties did nothing further.
At trial, the commissioner of the civil district court concluded that
Mrs. Schulingkamp did not accept the offer to buy prior to its withdrawal; hence, Mr. and Mrs. Aicklen were not responsible for their
promissory note-the cause for its making no longer existing. The district
court accepted and approved the commissioner's recommendations. On
appeal, the fourth circuit affirmed.
Simply put, the appellate panel determined that, while Mr. and Mrs.
Aicklen's offer stated it remained acceptable and irrevocable until the
act of sale (presumably some time after acceptance), under the circumstances "there existed a reasonable period of time in which plaintiff
could have accepted .... However, after thirty-six days that time period
became unreasonable, thus making the offer revocable." '26 This determination is not inconsistent with the purpose of irrevocable offers:
protection of persons reasonably attempting to accept. Further, from a
practical perspective, the court certainly must have been swayed by the
existence of a condition in the offer for the prospective vendor to secure

23. Id. "The act of sale was to take place 15 days after clear title to the lot was
obtained, and after the procurement of a five-foot side yard variance from Jefferson
Parish in order to build on the lot." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.at 1331.
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a variance and that "[d]uring this thirty-six day period very little, if
anything, had been done towards satisfying ' 27 this requirement.
On Choosing Words: Offers of Settlement and Attempted
Acceptances
Article 3071 of the Louisiana Civil Code defines a compromise as
"an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or
putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by mutual consent."
To "ensure proper proof, ' 2s the contract "must be either reduced into
writing or recited in open court and capable of being transcribed from
the record of the proceeding." 29 In addition, settlements "regulate only
the differences which appear clearly to be comprehended in them by
the intention of the parties." 30 Rhodes v. Nalencz3' demonstrates the
degree of written specificity the Code and the courts exact from the
parties negotiating a transaction, regardless of their probable, but unstated, intentions.
Carmel Rhodes filed an action against Richard Nalencz, d/b/a
McDonald's Restaurant, and Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company,
arising out of an alleged personal injury. After Mr. Rhodes' attorney
and the counsel for the defendants discussed the matter, Mr. Rhodes
orally authorized his lawyer to accept an offer of $27,500 to settle his
demand.3 2 The following day, Mr. Rhodes entertained second thoughts
about the planned compromise and unsuccessfully tried to contact his
attorney. When Mr. Rhodes ultimately reached his counsel, the lawyer
already had mailed to the attorney for the defendants a letter that
recited, in part, the following:
This is to confirm our telephone conversation today in which
my client, Mr. Carmel Rhodes, has given me the authority to
accept the sum of $27,500 in full settlement of his claim against
McDonald's Corporationand its insurer, Lumberman's Mutual
Casualty Company.
Please furnish me with your clients [sic] response at your earliest

convenience

3

The attorney for the defendants prepared and posted, on the same
day as the date of the correspondence from Mr. Rhodes' counsel, a

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Troxclair v. Parish of St. Charles, 450 So. 2d 759, 760 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
La. Civ. Code art. 3071.
La. Civ. Code art. 3073.
545 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 639.
Id.at 640 (emphasis added).
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letter saying, among other things, the following: "This . . .reduces our

settlement agreement in this case to writing. We have settled for $27,500.00
payable to Mr. Rhodes and you." '3 4 When Mr. Rhodes refused to execute
the documents evidencing a compromise, the defendants moved the

district court to order the plaintiff to sign a dismissal and a release in
exchange for $27,500. The trial court granted the requested relief. On
review, the fifth circuit court of appeal reversed.
The appellate panel correctly identified the confusion in the quoted

correspondence regarding the identity of the parties to the intended
settlement. Although both letters contemplate Mr. Rhodes relinquishing
his claims, it is not certain, from the writings, whether or not there
was a concurrence concerning the persons to be released. First, the letter

from Mr. Rhodes' counsel mentions "McDonald's Corporation," but it
was not a party to the suit. Second, the transmittal does not reference
Richard Nalencz, a named defendant in the litigation. Finally, the correspondence from the lawyer for Mr. Nalencz and Lumberman's Mutual
Casualty Company is ambiguous, stating that "We" have accepted the
proposal.
In order to be binding, a transaction must possess the essentials of

any other contract: capacity of the parties, consent, cause, and a lawful
object." Consent concerning the parties to the agreement is the element
missing in Rhodes v. Nalencz. From the crossing letters it is not certain
that the plaintiff and the defendants reached a mutual understanding.

Thus, the fifth circuit properly reversed the decision of the district court.
The result is not unjust even though Mr. Rhodes likely intended to
authorize his counsel to settle with the defendants to the lawsuit irrespective of McDonald's Corporation. While settlements are judicially
favored,3 6 compromises should be the result of careful consideration;
they must also be definite and in writing. If a writing, or a set of

writings,3 7 purporting to evidence a transaction is so unclear that it is

34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. E.g., Nugent v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 467 So. 2d 623, 627 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1985). See Hornsby v. Travelers Indem. Co., 128 So. 2d 280, 284 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1962); Chopin v. Federal Transp. Co., 70 So. 2d 189, 193 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
36. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Anderson, 533 So. 2d 118, 120 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988),
writ denied, 535 So. 2d 744 (1989) (citing C. Bel for Awnings, Inc. v. Blaine-Hays Constr.
Co., 532 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Saunders v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc., 387 So. 2d 603 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied, 394 So. 2d 614 (1980)).
37. Because the compromise must be written and signed by both parties "does not
necessarily mean that the agreement must be contained in one document .... [W]here
two instruments, when read together, outline the obligations each party has to the other
and evidence each party's acquiescence in the agreement, a written compromise .. . has
been perfected." Jacobson v. Harris, 503 So. 2d 540, 542 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 503 So. 2d 1019 (1987) (citing Felder v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 405 So. 2d 521
(La. 1981)).
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difficult to determine the identity of the parties to it or affected by it,
then a court should accord it no more weight than an oral, out of
court agreement of settlement-none."
Squinting Between the Lines and So-Called Implied Terms
New article 1906 defines a contract as "an agreement by two or
more parties whereby obligations are created, modified, or extin40
guished." 3 9 The essentials of the bargain are capacity of the parties,
42
4
consent of the parties, ' an object of their agreement, and a lawful
cause or purpose 41 supporting their promises or performances. Once
struck, the contract is the "law for the parties." 44 It is not necessary,
however, for the persons contracting to specify every detail of their
arrangement. If the parties have not addressed a topic, the Civil Code
or other parts of the law may supplement their agreement and add the
4
missing provisions.
Another matter altogether is the propriety of the judiciary to infer
or construct material terms of a purported agreement. When the Legislature has set forth the fundamental elements of the contracts of sale
and lease-and has included price in each46-it is troubling for the bench,
in an effort to achieve an ostensibly fair result in an isolated lawsuit,
to rule that price is not truly a necessary ingredient of the consent of
8
47
the parties. Nevertheless, the decade of the 1980s waxed and waned
with the Supreme Court of Louisiana doing just that.
In the case of Benglis Sash & Door Co. v. Leonards,49 decided in
1980, the court dealt with the following scenario: Leonards placed an
order for windows with Benglis Sash & Door Co. ("Benglis"); Benglis

38. La. Civ. Code art. 3071.
39. Old article 1761 read, fundamentally, the same way: "A contract is an agreement,
by which one person obligates himself to another to give, to do or permit, or not to do
something, expressed or implied by such agreement."
40. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1918-1926.
41. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1927-1947.
42. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1971-1977.
43. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1966-1970.
44. La. Civ. Code art. 1983.
45. For instance, new article 1868 designates an order of the imputation of payments
when the parties have not agreed to one. The examples of suppletive laws, indeed, are
numerous. Most are of this nature. See Garro, Codification Technique and the Problem
of Imperative and Suppletive Laws, 41 La. L. Rev. 1007 (1981). Significantly, only "laws
enacted for the protection of the public interest" may be varied. La. Civ. Code art. 7.
46. La. Civ. Code arts. 2464 & 2671.
47. Benglis Sash & Door Co. v. Leonards, 387 So. 2d 1171 (La. 1980).
48. Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000, 538 So. 2d 569 (La.
1989).
49. 387 So. 2d 1171 (La. 1980).
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informed Leonards that it would deliver the windows in eight to ten
weeks; neither Leonards nor Benglis mentioned either the price per
window or the price of the full order. After Benglis received the windows,
Leonards refused to accept delivery and Benglis stored the windows and
sued Leonards for the "purchase price." 50
The trial court ruled in favor of Benglis, but the third circuit court
of appeal reversed, concluding that the parties had not agreed upon a
price for the windows." Subsequently, the supreme court reinstated the
decision of the district court, determining that persons may consent to
a contract of sale without specifying price:
[I]t is not essential that the specific sum of the sales price be
stated at the time of contracting. The parties can agree that the
price may be ascertained by computation or that the price may
be fixed by arbitration. Or the parties can consent to buy and
to sell a certain thing for a reasonable price, and when they
do, the contract of sale has been perfected. The essential thing
is that there be a meeting of the minds (as opposed to a
52
disagreement) as to price.
Amazingly, the court referred to no authority for its view. Justice
Marcus, however, in dissent, pointed to a likely source of inspiration
for the majority's opinion: "Section 2-305 of the Uniform Commercial
Code provides ... that the parties may conclude a contract for sale
even though the price is not settled. . . . However, the Louisiana Legislature did not adopt this section of the Uniform Commercial Code." 53
Notwithstanding the court's attempts to align its sentiments with the
plain wording of article 2464 of the Louisiana Civil Code, 54 and its
requirement of a certain price in a contract of sale, the method, the
text, and the result of the opinion are dubious at best." Thankfully,

50. 378 So. 2d 992, 993 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
51. Id.at 994.
52. 387 So. 2d at 1173 (emphasis added).
53. 387 So. 2d at 1174 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
54. Article 2464 of the Civil Code, in part, reads as follows: "The price of the sale
must be certain, that is to say, fixed and determined by the parties."
55. Only one commentator, John M. Norwood of the College of Business Administration, Louisiana State University, defended and welcomed the case. Norwood, Certainty
of Price in Sales Contracts: Benglis Sash & Door Co. v. Leonards, 27 Loy. L. Rev. 457
(1981). Professor Norwood addressed the questions raised by Justice Marcus-that the
Legislature has not enacted Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and that the court
should enforce the Civil Code as it is written-as follows:
Two responses are appropriate: (1) The legislature has refused to adopt Article
2 of the U.C.C. as a whole, but this does not imply a legislative rejection of
each of the concepts embodied in Article 2; and (2) the judiciary is permitted,
even expected, to mold the law to conform to modern realities, so long as it
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the case produced little fanfare, and to date, it apparently has not
opened a Pandora's box of specious contract litigation. Unfortunately,
however, the court resurrected and reinforced the ideas of Benglis Sash
& Door Co. during the past term.
In Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000,56 the
supreme court faced this situation: Canal Place 2000 ("Canal Place")
contracted with RTKL for architectural, engineering, and consulting
services in connection with the construction of a mall and hotel complex;
RTKL, in turn, entered into a subcontract with CBM Engineers, Inc.
("CBM") for structural engineering services (including foundation engineering and design); and at the behest of Canal Place, CBM agreed
to have Morphy, Makofsky, and Masson, Inc. ("Morphy") "design and
perform engineering services for the foundation and first floor of the
structure."" CBM and Morphy did not execute a written contract or
concur about the method or terms of payment,5" and Morphy performed
the tasks assigned. When CBM and Morphy did not agree upon the
amount due, Morphy filed a lawsuit.
The commissioner of the civil district court decided that Morphy
had never contracted with CBM or anyone else, but that "an equitable
award 'under quasi-contract or de in rem verso, an action in unjust
enrichment' was in order." 5 9 The district court accepted the recommendation of the commissioner and cast CBM in judgment for $45,000,
but not the $78,613 Morphy had demanded via invoice. On appeal, the
fourth circuit affirmed, 6° grounding its decision upon Minyard v. Curtis
Products, Inc. ,61 Brignac v. Boisdore,61 and Edmonston v. A-Second
Mortgage Co. 63 For tenuous reasons, the supreme court reversed and
proclaimed that "Morphy has a substantive claim in contract, and the

does not directly contradict legislative mandates.
Id. at 465-66 (emphasis added). With respect to the final proposition, Professor Norwood's
approach to statutory construction is novel and illogical. Nowhere in the law of Louisiana
is there any support for the statement that Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
is applicable or enforceable, insofar as not inconsistent with the Civil Code or other laws.
Regarding the latter postulate, even accepting that the bench holds a policy-making function
in contract (as distinguished from tort) litigation, Benglis Sash & Door Co. does "directly
contradict legislative mandates."
56. 538 So. 2d 569 (La. 1989).
57. Id. at 570.
58. The Civil District Court Commissioner determined that Morphy "was a 'subcontractor,' to CBM, although working without a 'contract."' Id. at 571 (emphasis in
original).
59. Id.
60. 522 So. 2d 1223 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
61. 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (1967).
62. 288 So. 2d 31 (La. 1974).
63. 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974).
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existence of a claim or an express or implied contract precludes application of actio de in rem verso. ' ' 4
Invoking old article 1779 6 5-because the matter developed prior to
the effective date of Act 331 of 1984 (the revision of the law of
obligations)-which described the elements of a valid agreement, the
court judged that "[aill of these requisites were met in the present
case." ' 66 Additionally, the court announced that the failure of CBM and
Morphy to agree upon "the amount of compensation Morphy was to
receive for his [sic] services ... [did] not vitiate the contract, for the
law in this situation implies a provision that Morphy would be paid a
reasonable sum for his services."' 67 In support of its position, the court
cited old article 1903.68 Accordingly, on the basis of quantum meruit"as much as he deserves" 69-the supreme court ruled that the evidence

justified an award to Morphy in the amount it had invoiced CBM for
the services in question, "namely, $78,613.00."70
The fundamental flaw in the court's approach is its insistence on
applying the general principles of contract formation, irrespective of the
specific demands of the Civil Code governing the nominate agreement

CBM and Morphy sought to confect. From the facts recited in the
supreme court's opinion, it seems certain that CBM desired to lease
Morphy's labor or industry, 71 specifically to work by the job. 72 Thus,

64. 538 So. 2d 569, 572 (La. 1989).
65. La. Civ. Code art. 1779 (1870):
Four requisites are necessary to the validity of a contract:
1. Parties legally capable of contracting.
2. Their consent legally given.
3. A certain object, which forms the matter of agreement.
4. A lawful purpose.
66. 538 So. 2d at 573. Justice Calogero, writing for the court, further stated the
following:
At the very least an implied in fact contract existed between the parties. An
implied in fact contract is one which rests upon consent implied from facts and
circumstances showing mutual intention to contract. V-8 Taxi Cab Service, Inc.
v. Hayes, 322 So. 2d 442 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975). Such implied in fact contracts
are not different in their legal effect from express, written agreements. Comment,
Actio De in Rem Verso in Louisiana: Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 43 Tul.
L. Rev. 263, 298 (1969).
Id. at 573 (footnote omitted).
67. 538 So. 2d at 574 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
68. Old article 1903 read as follows: "The obligation of contracts extends not only
to what is expressly stipulated, but also to everything that, by law, equity or custom, is
considered as incidental to the particular contract, or necessary to carry it into effect."
69. 538 So. 2d at 574 n.9 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1119 (5th ed. 1979)).
70. Id. at 575.
71. Article 2673 of the Civil Code delineates two species of lease: "1. The letting
out of things. 2. The letting out of labor or industry."
72. Labor may be let out in three ways:
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to complete their agreement, the Civil Code demands that CBM and
Morphy reach a consensus about price. 73 Inexplicably, the court did not
focus upon this essential element, consent to price. Benglis Sash & Door
Co. evidenced the same error.
When the court writes that "Morphy's remedy at law was to sue
on the contract and have the court determine the remuneration he [sic]
should receive for the services he [sic] rendered to CBM," 74 it creates
three difficulties: (i) it departs, for reasons it does not articulate, from
its accepted, long-held role as a referee policing issues that arise from
and out of completed agreements and assumes the position of an arbitrator assisting the parties to perfect bargains; (ii) it does not discourage
sloppy draftsmanship in contract negotiations and formations; and (iii)
it invites parties, basically, to litigate their way to contract terms. These
are not the results the court should promote. The certainty of contracts
would be well-served through a reappraisal by the court of Benglis Sash
& Door Co. and Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place
2000.
Limitations of the Remedy of Specific Performance
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 drew distinctions, according to
each object, 75 regarding obligations to do, obligations not to do, 76 and

obligations to give. 77 More particularly, with respect to nonperformance,
the legislation provided that "[o]n the breach of any obligation to do,
or not to do, the obligee is entitled either to damages, or, in cases
which permit it, to a specific performance of the contract, at his option. ''78

72. Labor may be let out in three ways:
1. Laborers may hire their services to another person.
2. Carriers and watermen hire out their services for the conveyance either of
persons or of goods and merchandise.
3. Workmen hire out their labor or industry to make buildings or other works.
La. Civ. Code art. 2745. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2756-2777.
73. Article 2669 of the Civil Code states that lease is a contract "by which one party
gives to the other the enjoyment of a thing, or his labor, at a fixed price." (Emphasis
added.) In addition, "[tlo build by a plot, or to work by the job, is to undertake a
building or a work for a certain stipulated price." La. Civ. Code art. 2756 (emphasis
added).
74. 538 So. 2d at 574.
75. La. Civ. Code art. 1761 (1870); see A. Levasseur, Precis in Conventional Obligations: A Civil Code Analysis 4-6 (1980); Schewe, On Obligations to Pay Money with
a View Toward Stipulated Remedies and Usury, 44 La. L. Rev. 151, 153 (1983).
76. La. Civ. Code arts. 1926-1928, 2756, 2940 (1870). The Revised Civil Code continues
the categorization. La. Civ. Code art. 1986.
77. La. Civ. Code art. 1905 (1870).
78. La. Civ. Code art. 1926 (1870).
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Several years ago, in J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Northgate Mall, Inc.,
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the supreme court, although it ultimately declined to grant the relief,
rejected "the literal reading" 80 of the Code "that the general rule ...
is that the breach of a contract entitles the party aggrieved only to
damages; and specific performance may only be obtained where damages
would be inadequate compensation."'" Instead, the court, agreeing with
the view espoused by Dr. Litvinoff,82 proclaimed that "Articles 1926
through 1929 [of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870] were intended to
'83
give first rank to the obligee's right to performance in specific form."
The supreme court, however, carved out the following exceptions to a
policy of specific performance:
when it is impossible, greatly disproportionate in cost to the
actual damage caused, 4 no longer in the creditor's interest, or
85
of substantial negative effect upon the interests of third parties.
Sizeler Property Investors, Inc. v. Gordon Jewelry Corp. ,86 decided
last year, is helpful in understanding the case-by-case weighing of the
factors set forth in J. Weingarten, Inc. In 1979, the predecessor in

interest of Sizeler Property Investors, Inc. ("Sizeler") leased a portion
of Houma's Southland Mall to Leonard Krower & Son, Inc. ("Krower"),

79. 404 So. 2d 896 (La. 1981).
80. Id.at 900.
81. Id.
82. 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations §§ 162-68, in7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed.
1975).
83. 404 So. 2d at 900. The court, however, noted that the bench is "empowered to
withhold specific performance in some exceptional cases even when ... [it] is possible."
Id. at 901. Tribunals in France have denied requests for specific performance in the
following situations:
whenever the inconvenience of such forced execution would exceed the advantage,
as when the cost of performing in kind is disproportionate to the actual damage
caused, or when it is no longer in the creditor's interest, or when it would
have a negative effect upon the interest of third parties.
Id. at 901 (citing S. Litvinoff, supra note 82, at § 166; 2 M. Planiol, Treatise on the
Civil No. 171A, at 103 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959); Szladits, The Concept of
Specific Performance in Civil Law, 4 Am. J.Comp. L. 208, 217 (1955)).
84. This notion should not be viewed differently from the analogous idea at common
law of the prohibition of "economic waste." See Groves v. John Wunder Co., 205 Minn.
163, 286 N.W. 235 (1939) (the performance of the promise to grade sand and sand pit
would cost $60,000 while the property, after the restoration, would be worth only $12,000);
J. Calamari & J. Perillio, The Law of Contracts § 14-29, at 560-62 (2d ed. 1977); E.
Farnsworth & W. Young, Cases and Materials on Contracts 617-18 (3d ed. 1980); Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry of Contract Law,
1969 Duke L.J. 49.
85. 404 So. 2d 896, 901 (1981).
86. 544 So. 2d 53 (La. App. 4th Cir.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 550 So. 2d
237 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted, 548 So. 2d 1215, order dissolved, 552 So. 2d 372
(1989).
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at the time a subsidiary of Gordon Jewelry Corporation ("Gordon").
Krower subsequently assigned its interests in the lease to BCS, Inc./
United Jewelers & Distributors, Inc. ("United Jewelers"). In 1988, United
Jewelers, while continuing "to pay timely rent, ' 8 7 ceased operations at
the Southland Mall. Sizeler, relying on a "continuous operations" clause
in the lease, sued Gordon and United Jewelers, demanding, in essence,
the "reopening and operating [of] the store in question.""8 The district
court granted Sizeler's request for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
compelling the specific performance of the continuous operations provision of the lease.
In reversing, the fourth circuit referred to new article 198689 and
the exception of impossibility of specific performance, noted in J. Weingarten, Inc. Although the appellate panel appropriately determined that
Sizeler was not entitled to specific performance of the continuous operations clause of the lease, its rationale for the decision may be off
the mark.9° There are at least three valid reasons, however, why the
trial court should not have ordered specific performance.
First, the text of new article 1986 supplies a solution. The object
of the agreement to continuous operations of the business upon the
leasehold is an obligation to do. Accordingly, "[u]pon a failure to
perform an obligation .. . to do, the granting of specific performance

87.
88.
89.

544 So. 2d at 54.
Id.
La. Civ. Code art. 1986:
Upon an obligor's failure to perform an obligation to deliver a thing, or not
to do an act, or to execute an instrument, the court shall grant specific performance plus damages for delay if the obligee so demands. If specific performance is impracticable, the court may allow damages to the obligee.
Upon the failure to perform an obligation that has another object, such an
obligation to do, the granting of specific performance is at the discretion of
the court.
(Emphasis added.)
90. To illustrate, the court wrote that "[d]ue to the circumstances of this case, we
find specific performance to be virtually impossible." 544 So. 2d at 55. The court's choice
of words is unfortunate, for the impossibility exception to the policy of specific performance
should be considered in the same manner as impossibility is treated as a mode of
extinguishing obligations. La. Civ. Code arts. 1872-1878. Specifically, the impossibility
contemplated by article 1873 of the Civil Code is absolute. Comment (d) to article 1873
intends to make this point: "To relieve an obligor of liability the eas fortuit must make
the performance truly impossible. See 7 Planiol et Ripert, Traite pratique de droit civil
francais 168-72 (2d ed. Esmein 1954). The Louisiana jurisprudence has so held." (Citing
Eugster & Co. v. Joseph West & Co., 35 La. Ann. 119 (1883).) Certainly, the court did
not declare the performance by Gordon of the continuous operations part of the lease
to be absolutely impossible; it deemed the actions, instead, to be virtually impossible. In
all likelihood, the court desired to say that the enforcement of the continuous operations
clause was impracticable.
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is at the discretion of the court." 91 Sizeler, thus, was not entitled to
an order granting its request for specific performance. The fourth circuit
was not required to find an exception to a policy of specific performance,
because the principle was inapposite. In short, the panel could have
reasoned that the trial court incorrectly perceived Sizeler to be entitled
to the relief it sought and that, in its discretion, specific performance
was not in order.
Second, assuming for purposes of discussion that the circumstances
granted Sizeler a right to compel Gordon's specific performance, the
evidence Gordon presented to the trial court strongly suggested that the
costs it would expend to operate the business at Southland Mall would
be "greatly disproportionate in cost to actual damage caused" 92 Sizeler
by the breach of this part of the lease. Gordon asserted that the business
requires a unique type of inventory, special contacts in the industry,
and particular display equipment that, all told, would be far greater in
expense for it to secure than the benefits Sizeler would receive. 93 With
this type of evidence, the appellate panel could have decided that, even
if Sizeler otherwise would have prevailed in its claim for specific performance, in this case the factors of J. Weingarten, Inc. favored Gordon.
Third, in addition to seeking an order requiring Gordon to operate
the business, Sizeler demanded an award of $500,000 based upon a
liquidated damages section of the lease. The Civil Code recognizes the
secondary obligation of a contractual stipulation of money damages in
the event of "nonperformance, defective performance, or delay in performance. ' '94 A creditor, like Sizeler, however, may not demand both
the stipulated damages and performance. 95 Thus, completely aside from
the tests for specific performance recited in new article 1986 and jurisprudentially developed in J. Weingarten, Inc., the fourth circuit would
have been on firm ground reversing the judgment of the district court
because of the competing prayers.

91. La. Civ. Code art. 1986. Comment (c) further explains this limitation:
If the obligation which the obligee has failed to perform is an obligation to
do, the granting of specific performance lies with the discretion of the court,
to be exercised in a manner consistent with the principle that the obligor's
personal freedom ordinarily may not be encroached upon. See 7 Planiol et
Ripert, Traite pratique de droit civil francais 95-96 (2nd ed. by Esmein, 1954).
See also 2 Litvinoff, Obligations 312-313 (1975).
92. J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Northgate Mall, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 901.
93. Gordon presented evidence to the district court that it would cost it more than
$2,000,000 to reopen the business, a figure four time the liquidated damages claimed by
Sizeler.
94. La. Civ. Code art. 2005.
95. La. Civ. Code art. 2007.

